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2 
Abstract 
In this report we present the Equality of opportunity approach, clarifying its theoretical foundations and 
empirical implications, and develop policy implications especially in the area of human capital investment. 
According to the equality of opportunity (EOp) approach, a primary goal of public policies is to insure that 
individuals develop their lives in a context where the playfield is levelled.  The main idea behind EOp is that 
inequality in outcomes (e.g., income, wealth, human capital/education and health) is acceptable to the extent 
that it reflects the result of individual choices taken by individuals that share the same opportunities. According 
to the “equality of opportunities principle”, inequalities that are due to variables beyond individual’s control, 
called circumstances, (e.g. family socioeconomic and cultural background, ethnic origin, gender, age etc.), should 
be eliminated or compensated for by public intervention. Only those variables within the sphere of individual’s 
autonomy, called effort, (e.g., number of hours devoted to study or work, quality of the work supplied, 
occupational choices etc.) can justify a difference in the relevant outcome variable. This implies that the equality 
of opportunity approach is consistent with the notion of fair inequality, as long as it originates from effort. 
 
3 
1 Introduction 
The European Pillar of Social Rights is at the basis of the European Social model, one in which equity and 
efficiency are jointly pursued by investing in human capital, through education, training, and lifelong learning. 
This model stresses the importance of social policies, including the provision of adequate health care, child and 
long-term care, active labour market policies and appropriate unemployment insurance schemes.  
Equality of opportunities irrespective of gender, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, age or sexual orientation 
is stated in Title 3 of Chapter 1 of the European Pillar of Social Rights. The same Pillar, at Title 1 in Chapter 1, 
clearly indicates that everyone in the EU has a right to quality and inclusive education, training and life-long 
learning, so as to fully participate in modern societies. The commitment to make education and training systems 
more equitable and inclusive, including for migrants and refugees, has been explicitly made at the UNESCO 
“Global Education Meeting” held in Brussels in December 2018, in the context of a political discussion on the 
UN 2030 Sustainable Development Goals. 
Attention to equity and social inclusion in education is also permeating the 2016 New Skills agenda, the 2016 
Communication Investing in Europe's Youth, the Communication on Improving and Modernizing Education (COM 
(2016) 941), the Communication on an EU renewed agenda for Higher Education (COM (2017) 247), and the 
Communication on School Development and Excellent Teaching for a Great Start in Life (COM (2017) 248). It is 
also present in the political guidelines of the Von der Leyen Commission. 
In this report we present the Equality of opportunity approach, clarifying its theoretical foundations and 
empirical implications, and develop policy implications especially in the area of human capital investment. 
According to the equality of opportunity (EOp) approach, a primary goal of public policies is to insure that 
individuals develop their lives in a context where the playfield is levelled.  The main idea behind EOp is that 
inequality in outcomes (e.g., income, wealth, human capital/education and health) is acceptable to the extent 
that it reflects the result of individual choices taken by individuals that share the same opportunities (“the 
opportunity set”). According to the “equality of opportunities principle”, inequalities that are due to variables 
beyond individual’s control, called circumstances, (e.g. family socioeconomic and cultural background, ethnic 
origin, gender, age etc.), should be eliminated or compensated for by public intervention. Only those variables 
within the sphere of individual’s autonomy, called effort, (e.g., number of hours devoted to study or work, quality 
of the work supplied, occupational choices etc.) can justify a difference in the relevant outcome variable. This 
implies that the equality of opportunity approach is consistent with the notion of fair inequality, as long as it 
originates from effort. Notice that the equality of opportunity approach looks at all the factors that are outside 
individual control, not just parental background. Hence, it is different from (relative) social mobility, where the 
focus is on the comparison of income/occupational classes of offsprings to that of their parents. 
The equality of opportunity approach is very appealing as it satisfies two main principles that are broadly 
accepted across the political spectrum: 1) compensation, i.e. a disadvantage/advantage due to characteristics 
for which individuals have no responsibility should be compensated for by public authorities; 2) responsibility, 
i.e. individuals are free to take their own decisions, of which they should bear the consequences. In fact, even 
economists who strongly question the ability of the governments to undertake welfare-enhancing income 
distribution policies, accept that one of the main roles of the government is to supply fair rules and promote 
equality of opportunities. One could argue that the equality of opportunity approach is the prevailing concept 
of social justice in Western countries. The actual interpretation of “levelling the playing field”, however, remains 
subject to political and ethical judgement.  
This report proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses the concept of equality of opportunity, its origins and its 
interpretation by modern philosophers and social scientists. It also discusses its policy implications and the 
relationship with similar concepts and perspectives that are sometimes grouped under the same "umbrella". 
Section3 presents various approaches to the measurement of inequality of opportunity, while Section 4 
summarizes results from various studies estimating inequality of opportunity in different countries and with 
different approaches. Section 5 concludes.  
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2 The EOp Theory 
A preliminary clarification is needed: the concepts of equality, equity, justice and fairness are closely related, 
but they are not all synonymous. While equity, fairness, and justice implicitly require a definition of what is 
equitable, just and fair, and hence rely upon normative criteria defined elsewhere, the concept of equality refers 
to the quality of being identical in status, value or quantity, which does not strictly require any normative criteria. 
As a consequence, equity/fairness/justice does not necessarily imply equality. In fact, vertical equity requires 
individuals that differ in some relevant characteristic to be treated differently.  
The origin of the concepts of equity, equality, justice and fairness can be found in Ethics and Law, but with the 
development of Social Sciences they became very important in this area as well, and a whole branch of 
Economics (i.e. Welfare Economics) was developed as a response to the limits of the concept of efficiency, with 
the intent to make explicit the prevalent distributional justice criteria. The welfarist approach poses that social 
decisions should be based on some form of aggregation of individual welfare: different forms of aggregation 
(i.e. Social Welfare Functions) have been proposed, with the utilitiarian being one of the most often adopted in 
public decision making. The welfarist approach has had the great merit of bringing attention to potential equity-
efficiency trade-offs, which are often at the heart of socio-economic policies (e.g., a given tax reform might 
increase equity but reduce efficiency: given a well-defined social welfare criteria it is possible to solve the trade-
off). 
The traditional welfarist approach is fundamentally based on three pillars: 1) individual outcomes should be 
observed and measured; 2) these outcomes need to be "translated" into individual welfare measures; 3) a social 
criteria (Social Welfare Function) need to be defined over the space of individual welfare measures. However, 
it is scarcely informative on the fairness of the process by which individuals generate income or achieve a given 
economic and social status. This led some economists, philosophers and social scientists (e.g., Dworkin, Rawls, 
Roemer, Sen) to develop the concept of equality of opportunity. What these contribution have in common is the 
attempt to go beyond the analysis of (in)equality of outcomes (income, health, education etc.) and move towards 
the definition of "opportunities" as the relevant space for social policies. The fairness of a given distribution 
cannot be evaluated by simply observing the inequality in the distribution of the relevant outcomes: it becomes 
necessary to observe how the observed outcomes are derived from choice sets available to individuals. A given 
distribution of economic and social status can be considered fair if, besides respecting some procedural rules, 
it is also the result of efforts exerted by individuals that “play on a levelled field”.  
In the last decades, many political philosophers have argued that a society is to be considered equitable if 
"opportunities", rather than outcome, are equally distributed (Rawls, 1971; Sen, 1985; Dworkin, 1981a, 1981b; 
Cohen, 1989; Arneson, 1989, 1999). Recognizing the role of the individual responsibility in the evaluation of 
social arrangements, supporters of this approach assert that not all the differences arising from the outcome 
distribution in a society are equally unfair. In particular, outcome disparities due to personal choices are less 
ethically objectionable than disparities caused by exogenous attributes over which individuals cannot exert any 
form of control. Hence, an equitable society, according to the principle of equality of opportunity, would be one 
in which only disparities due to individual choices arise. 
The sources of inequality also play an important role with respect to various socio-economic dimensions. 
First, attitude surveys and field experiments show that individuals are in general more prone to accept inequality 
stemming from their own choices, while perceiving inequalities due to pre-determined factors as highly unfair. 
On the other hand, economists argue that some sources of inequality are necessary, acting as an incentive to 
exert more effort. Second, the source of economic inequality also affects individual preferences for redistribution 
and for political orientation (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Fong, 2001; Gaviria, 2006): when individuals believe 
that economic success depends on the effort exerted rather than on exogenous circumstances, there appears 
to be low support for redistributive policies; on the other hand,  support for redistribution appears to increase 
when respondents believe that a large amount of existing inequalities is due to unequal opportunities. Finally, 
inequality of opportunity among different groups of the society may give useful insights to explain the economic 
and institutional mechanisms that generate outcome inequalities. Moreover, the degree of opportunity 
inequality in a society is related to the potentials for future growth (see World Bank, 2006, among others). 
Suboptimal allocation of resources and a lower potential for growth may, in fact, be generated by the influence 
of exogenous factors on the individual income and occupation prospects. Further, the persistence of inequality 
in the initial opportunities may provoke the formation of inequality traps that, preventing the (full) participation 
of some groups of the population to economic activity, become detrimental for growth.  
The relevance of the role played by the individual responsibility and by the source of inequality in the 
assessment of social states has motivated a variety of declinations of the "equality of opportunity" concept. 
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Starting from Roemer (1993,1998), Van de gaer (1993) and Fleurbaey (1995), a specific part of the economic 
literature - the equality of opportunity literature - has been increasingly devoted to develop formal models 
aimed at capturing each single specification of the equality of opportunity concept. These equal-opportunity 
frameworks encompass a libertarian view, since they dictate that public policies should be respectful of the 
individual freedom to pursue her/his own goals. However, by promoting equality in conditions that are beyond 
the individual control, they also reflect an egalitarian orientation. 
In what follows a review of the background literature on the theory of equality of opportunity is provided1 
. In particular, we discuss the different EOp concepts proposed by the literature, how they relate and their 
policy implications. Following this, the main approaches adopted to measure inequality of opportunity, 
from both a theoretical and empirical viewpoint, are presented and discussed.   
 
2.1 Philosophical foundations 
The choice between opportunity and outcome as the proper "currency of egalitarian justice" (Cohen, 1989) has 
been animatedly debated in political philosophy for the last four decades. The increasing favor met by the 
former is due to the appealing feature of the EOp view that recognizes the role of the individual responsibility 
in the evaluation of social arrangements. However, in shifting the assessment of "equality" from the space of 
final achievements to the space of opportunities, the contemporary theories of justice differ in the way they 
frame the border between external opportunities and individual responsible choices factors. 
Rawls (1971), who initiated this debate, proposes "primary good", in the form of rights and resources, as the 
correct space for equality judgements. He argues that, once individuals are equally endowed with primary goods, 
they will be deemed responsible for the differences arising in the final level of well-being. These differences, in 
fact, depend on the process followed by each individual to translate those rights and resources into final 
outcomes. Dworkin (1981a, 1981b) shares the same idea, but proposes to extend the notion of resources to 
encompass, in addition to transferable goods and wealth, personal talents and handicap, that deserve 
compensatory schemes. A society is, thus, equitable if the distribution of transferable goods is such that it 
compensates individuals for their poorer endowment and non-transferable resources. 
In later contributions, Arneson (1989) and Cohen (1989) question the concept of equality of resources and 
embrace the concept of equality of opportunity for welfare. Their conviction is that the sphere of the individual 
responsibility should be limited to characteristics and choices that are fully under the individual control; this 
sphere can include the way individuals make use of their rights and resources or can exclude it. The relevant 
distinction is not between resources and preferences, but between factors within and outside the individual 
control. This implies that individual preferences can fall outside the sphere of the individual responsibility, 
depending on the processes generating those preferences. For example, if the preferences are determined by 
the external environment, they can be considered as outside the domain of individual responsibility. 
Although formally different, these philosophical frameworks possess a common feature. They endorse a view 
of egalitarian justice that attempts to incorporate the role of individual responsibility in the evaluation of social 
states2. They all share the belief that an opportunity egalitarian perspective to social justice requires "levelling 
the playing field"3. Thus, social justice should only be concerned with the equalization of everyone's initial 
opportunities, letting the individual, through her choices, be the only determinant of her final achievements. 
 
2.2 The basic economic framework 
According to this philosophical stream, a society can be defined "fair" only if it satisfies the norm of equality 
of opportunity: unchosen inequalities should be eliminated, while inequalities arising from individuals' own 
choices should not. Later works attempt to formalize these philosophical insights within economic 
frameworks (Roemer, 1993, 1998; Van de gaer, 1993; Fleurbaey, 1995). They are aimed at 
operationalizing the concept of equality of opportunity by addressing: (i) the measurement of the degree 
of inequality of opportunity; (ii) the design of redistribution mechanisms able to enhance the degree of 
                                           
1  This Section is meant to provide an overlook of the EOp theory. For detailed and comprehensive surveys the reader can refer to 
Ferreira and Peragine (2016), Roemer and Trannoy (2016), Ramos and Van de gaer (2016), Pignataro (2012). 
2  Sen (1985) also proposes a similar approach. 
3  See Roemer (1998). 
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equality of opportunity. 
The basic economic model builds on the assumption that the individual outcome, 𝑥𝑥 (income, health or education, 
for instance), is jointly determined by two sets of characteristics: circumstances and responsibility, or effort for 
brevity. Circumstances, denoted by 𝐶𝐶, are pre-determined factors - such as race, gender and socio-economic 
background - acting independently form the individual's own free will. The individual cannot be deemed 
accountable for circumstances, since they are externally imposed (i.e. she does not choose them). Effort, 
denoted by 𝑒𝑒, instead, is a factor the individual can be deemed accountable for, since it stems from her own 
choice. Effort includes the extent to which a person exerts herself and all the other characteristics that affect 
her outcome but are not encompassed in the set of circumstances. These assumptions can be summarized in 
the following equation4: 
 𝑥𝑥 = 𝑔𝑔(𝐶𝐶, 𝑒𝑒) (1) 
That is, circumstances and effort are transformed into final outcome through a monotonic function, 𝑔𝑔(∙), which 
is the same for all the individuals in the population. Given eq. (1), it is possible to partition the population into 
"types" and "tranches". 
A type is a group of individuals sharing the same set of circumstances and having access to the same 
opportunity set. An opportunity set is represented by all possible final outcomes individuals may enjoy, after 
exerting the effort they choose to put in. Individuals within each type can differ in the level of effort exerted. 
A tranche is a group of individuals exerting the same effort. Individuals within the same effort group may belong 
to different types. 
 
Box 1. The identification of effort 
The partition in tranches is demanding in terms of data, because it requires information on effort. If effort 
is observed directly (through labour hours, for example) the partition is straightforward. It effort is 
unobservable, the most frequent solution is the RIA (Roemer's Identification Assumption). It states that 
individuals that are ranked the same in the distribution of income of each type have exercised the same 
degree of effort. This is possible since, from eq. (1), individuals belonging to the same type may only differ 
in the effort exerted. As the function 𝑔𝑔(∙) is assumed to be increasing in the level of effort, it follows that 
the higher is the level of effort exerted the higher is the outcome an individual gets. It can be then inferred 
that ranking individuals according to their level of outcome in each type implies ranking them on the base 
of their effort.  
RIA also solves the problem of correlation between circumstances and effort. What is often used to identify 
effort ("how hard you try"), tends to be correlated with circumstances. As a consequence, circumstances, 
besides affecting directly the final outcome, also affect the ability/incentive of an individual to exert a 
certain level of effort. For example, it is reasonable to believe that a professor's son has higher incentives 
to study than a farmer's son, because the culture at home is likely academically orientated. Hence, the level 
of effort of the professor's son is not strictly comparable to that exerted by the farmer's son. In order to 
make meaningful comparisons, it is necessary to obtain a normatively relevant evaluation of effort, by 
depuring the level of effort exerted from the impact of circumstances5. This procedure can be accomplished 
through the RIA. RIA, taking into account the differences arising in each type specific distribution of effort, 
permits inter-type comparable measures of effort: the "degree" of effort6. 
                                           
4  This is a pure deterministic model: for any given set of circumstances, any variation in individual income is attributed to personal 
effort. In this model circumstances and effort are assumed to be uncorrelated. Extensions of this basic framework include also luck, 
unobservable variables, and an error term, as additional components of the individual outcome (see Fleurbaey, 2008; Lefranc et al., 
2009; Ramos and Van de gaer, 2016). 
5  The literature proposes alternative solutions to this problem. For example, Bourguignon et al. (2007) use econometric techniques, like 
regression analysis, to obtain cleaned normatively relevant effort variables. It is the disturbance term in a regression of effort on 
circumstances. 
6  Note the difference between the level of effort and degree of effort. The level of effort is the pure expenditure of effort. It does not 
account for the fact that the distribution of effort for a type is a characteristic of the type and a circumstance for the individual. The 
"degree" of effort, instead, neutralizes the effect of the distribution of effort within a given type. For instance, let's imagine that effort 
is proxied by educational achievement. The level of effort would simply coincide with the individual educational achievement. However, 
we know that educational achievement is heavily influenced by parental socio-economic background (which is a circumstance). Hence, 
as suggested by RIA, to make comparisons of effort across types meaningful, we would have to look at the distribution of educational 
7 
From the definition of individual outcome, given in eq. (1), it can be inferred that the overall inequality in the 
distribution of final outcomes derives from two different sources. The first source is associated to 
circumstances, 𝐶𝐶. When circumstances act on the final outcome, provoking disparities among the opportunity 
sets faced by individuals belonging to different types, there will be inequality of opportunity. This would be the 
case when circumstances such as gender, race, and health status affect outcomes irrespectively of the amount 
of effort expressed by individuals. The second source is associated to the effect of effort, 𝑒𝑒. Individuals exerting 
different effort may obtain different outcomes, even if they share the same set of circumstances. While the 
first source of inequality is intrinsically unfair, the second source is considered as morally acceptable, because 
it is the result of the individuals' own choices.7 
Then, the question arising is: when is a distribution of outcomes, defined as above, coherent with the norm of 
equality of opportunity? 
The answer depends on the alternative ways of accounting for circumstance and effort factors within the EOp 
framework. Two factors mainly determine the result: the first is the particular list of characteristics comprised 
in the set of circumstances8; the second depends on the way in which equality of opportunity is declined 
(according to two different principles - compensation and reward) and evaluated (according to two different 
perspectives – ex-ante and ex-post). 
2.2.1 EOp principles 
The first principle, the principle of compensation, endorses an egalitarian view. It states that differences in 
individual outcomes, unambiguously determined by differences in circumstances, are unfair and need to be 
compensated by society. According to this principle, equality of opportunity would prevail in a situation where 
inequalities due to circumstances are eliminated.  
The second principle, the principle of reward, focuses on how to be fair to individuals with identical 
circumstances and unequal effort, and how to allot outcome to effort. It states that differences in individual 
achievements, unambiguously attributed to differences in effort, are equitable and should not be compensated. 
According to this principle, equality of opportunity would prevail in a situation where only inequalities in final 
outcomes due to effort are preserved9. 
Although the compensation and the reward principle can be interpreted as two independent sub-goals of the 
opportunity egalitarian theory, they can be incompatible10. This happens because compensation focuses on the 
inequality between individuals characterized by different circumstances, whereas, reward focuses on the 
inequality due to effort among individuals with equal circumstances. Hence, embracing one principle instead of 
the other does make a difference in the evaluation of the equality of opportunity of a society. 
2.2.2 EOp perspectives 
The differences stemming from the compensation and the reward principle are reflected in the two different 
perspectives adopted to evaluate the extent of (in)equality of opportunity. The ex-ante and the ex-post 
perspectives, in fact, are not always coherent with both principles at the same time. This duality may generate 
alternative interpretations of the EOp concept, causing different rankings of social states (Fleurbaey and 
Peragine, 2013; Peragine, 2004a, 2004b; Ramos and Van de gaer, 2016). 
According to the ex-ante approach, there is equality of opportunity if everyone can access the same set of 
opportunities regardless of her circumstances (Van de gaer, 1993; Kranich, 1997). Therefore such approach 
relies on the evaluation of individuals’ opportunity sets, namely outcome prospects (e.g. educational 
achievement, health status, working status), in comparison with those of individuals with different 
circumstances. The lower is the difference between the sets of opportunities enjoyed by individuals belonging 
                                           
achievement within each type (assuming that the latter would be determined by socio-economic background only). Then, for each 
type, we would rank individuals with respect to their educational achievement for this specific type. These rankings – which capture 
the degree of effort- are comparable across types, because a normalization has been imposed. 
7  This leaves open the indirect role of circumstances, since they also affect effort. This issue is addressed in the empirical literature by 
adopting different econometric specifications.  
8  For instance, age, ethnicity, parental background, social connections, formation of beliefs, genetic transmission of native ability, or 
any other relevant exogenous characteristic. 
9  The reward principle can be further decomposed into two sub-principles: the natural or liberal reward and the utilitarian reward. See 
Fleurbaey (2008) for details. 
10  These principles originate from the literature on fair division models (see Fleurbaey, 2008; Fleurbaey and Maniquet, 2006, 2008). 
Their introduction in the EOp context motivates, instead, the development of different approaches to measure inequality of 
opportunity. 
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to different types, the higher is equality of opportunity. Therefore, "compensation" should be applied between 
opportunity sets, in order to make them as equal as possible.  
According to the ex-post approach there is equality of opportunity if individuals exerting the same degree of 
effort obtain the same outcome (Roemer, 1993; Fleurbaey, 1995). The lower is the difference in the outcome 
enjoyed by individuals who exert the same degree of effort, the higher is equality of opportunity. For instance, 
we would have high equality of opportunity when pupils with the same academic achievement (which can be 
interpreted as a proxy for effort) have the same chances of obtaining successful social positions.  When equality 
of opportunity does not exist, "compensation" should be applied between the outcomes of individuals exerting 
the same degree of effort, in order to make them as (outcome) equal a possible. 
The benchmark for both perspectives is a society in which circumstances are no longer the source of inequalities. 
However, important differences between the ex-ante and the ex-post approaches arise. 
A first difference stands out from the terminology ex-ante/ex-post. The ex-ante perspective advocates equality 
of opportunity in a situation where circumstances are known but effort is not, hence before individuals make 
their choice. The ex-post perspective advocates equality of opportunity in a situation where all variables are 
known, hence once individuals have made their choice. Second, the informational base necessary to evaluate 
EOp is different. While the ex-ante perspective only requires information on circumstances, the ex-post approach 
requires information on circumstances and individual effort. The ex-ante approach focuses on the inequality 
between social groups, emphasizing the differences between the sets of choices available to them. It is instead 
neutral with respect to the inequality arising within each group (which is interpreted as the result of effort). 
Hence, the ex-ante perspective only accounts for the direct effect of circumstances on the set of opportunities 
available to different social groups. The ex-post approach focuses on the inequality within groups of individuals 
exerting the same degree of effort. Hence, this approach is also able to account for the indirect effect of 
circumstances on effort. 
The difference in the informational base has also implications from an empirical point of view. Thanks to its 
data parsimony, the ex-ante is, up to now, the most used approach. On the other hand, the ex-post approach, 
being more data demanding, makes possible a finer evaluation of inequality of opportunity. 
Moreover, although the two perspectives are both coherent with the EOp idea, they can be mutually inconsistent, 
as it is shown in the following example. 
 
Example 1: Assume that we want to compare two societies, A and B according to EOp. Assume that we can 
partition both populations in four types (rows: they correspond to circumstances) and two tranches (columns: 
they correspond to effort), such that we have the following matrices: 
 
 𝐴𝐴 = �25 2020 1535 1130 6 �        𝐵𝐵 = �
26 2020 1435 1229 6 � 
 
In society 𝐴𝐴, the first row has better opportunities than the second one and the third row has better than the 
forth (no matter what the level of effort is, type 1 has higher outcome than type 2 and type 3 has a higher 
outcome than type 4). Increasing 𝐴𝐴₁₁ and decreasing 𝐴𝐴₂₂ makes the inequalities between the first and second 
row increase. Increasing 𝐴𝐴32 and decreasing 𝐴𝐴41makes the inequalities between the third and the fourth row 
increase. The combination of the two can generate society 𝐵𝐵. Hence, according to the ex-ante perspective of 
EOp A dominates 𝐵𝐵. Now suppose that we are in society 𝐵𝐵. Increasing 𝐵𝐵₄₁ and decreasing 𝐵𝐵₁₁, makes the 
inequality in the first column increase. Increasing 𝐵𝐵₂₂ and decreasing 𝐵𝐵₃₂ makes the inequality in the second 
column increase. The combination of the two manipulations may result in society A. According to the ex-post 
perspective to EOp, B dominates A, contradicting the previous dominance.  
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The tension between the ex-ante and ex-post approach allows perceiving the tension between compensation 
and reward. The ex-ante perspective is consistent with both the compensation and the reward principles11. The 
ex-post perspective, instead, is only consistent with compensation. 
2.3 Policy implications 
The choice between an ex-ante vs. ex-post perspective, while relevant from both a theoretical and empirical 
perspective, does not have relevant consequences in terms of policy implications. Two broad types of policies  
directed at reducing inequality of opportunity can be identified. On the one hand, there are policies that try to 
reduce the relevance of the various circumstances, as drivers of inequality: at an extreme, if all the 
circumstances would become irrelevant we would obtain complete equality of opportunity. On the other hand, 
and assuming that some inequality due to circumstances remains, policies should try to compensate for this 
persistent inequality.  
Let's imagine that the focus is on equality of opportunity in labour income and it appears that gender is an 
important determinant, since i) women tend to be more represented in low-wage professions, ii) within the 
same occupation, women tend to perform the lowest paid tasks or have limited prospects for professional 
development; iii) everything else equal (including education, occupations and tasks), women are paid less per 
hour; iv) everything else equal (including education, occupations, tasks and wages) women tend to work less 
hours. Point i) – which is consistent with vertical segregation- calls for policies directed at increasing the 
educational attainment of women, their level of skills and their education/professional aspirations. Policies could 
be financial, such as monetary support to females attending tertiary education (e.g. reduced fees, scholarships 
etc.), or non-financial, such as policies directed at breaking gender stereotypes (e.g. policies for increasing the 
number of females pursuing STEM education). This second type of policies could also work to reduce the effect 
of point ii) –horizontal segregation- on the gender gap. Vertical and horizontal segregation could also be reduced 
by setting gender quotas.  The inequality discussed at point iii) could be eliminated by policies directed at 
insuring equal pay for man and women with same individual characteristics and employed in identical 
occupations and performing identical tasks. Point iv) type of inequality is more subtle, as it appears to stem 
from "choices", typically in connection with household related tasks (e.g. taking care of the children and the 
elderly). The problem is that, in this area, the border between "free" and "constrained" choices is very fuzzy and 
policies should make sure that women' choices in relation to labour market participation are not imposed on 
them. Policies favouring parental leave for males work to reduce gender stereotypes and hence to reduce the 
relevance of this type of inequality.  
Region of birth is often found to be an important circumstance affecting labour income. Policies should first try 
to reduce regional disparities in all the dimensions that are relevant for the variable of interest. In this case this 
would imply making sure that there are no significant differences across regions in terms of quality and quantity 
of infrastructures, education, health care and job opportunities. However, governmental control over job 
opportunities is limited.  These depend upon local and global conditions, which in many cases require 
interventions that can produce effects only in the medium to long term (e.g. policies directed at addressing 
changes in industrial structure or at fighting the presence of organized crime).  Since policies directed at 
equalizing opportunity sets across regions would take years to be effective, it is important to put in place 
compensatory policies that reduce the effect of the regional circumstance even in the short run, such as  policies 
directed at supporting access to and completion of education (including tertiary education) for individuals 
residing in the poorer regions, or reduced taxation for those who reside or invest in these areas.  
Considering now the area of education, it is well known that parental socio-economic background plays the 
largest role in accounting for inequalities in educational attainment (measured in terms of test scores- e.g. PISA 
scores - or in terms of highest level of education attended). Different aspects can explain why parental 
background is so important. First, we know that financial resources play an important role in human capital 
investment decisions, and more so in countries characterized by a large presence of private education. In order 
to equalize opportunity sets, public policies should focus on redistributing income towards poorer households, 
especially those with children of school age. Such redistribution could be unconditional (i.e. income support to 
poor households) or could be targeted to the purchase of education services (for instance using education 
vouchers, grants or reduced fees for disadvantaged students). However, financial constraints are just one of 
the drivers of educational inequalities. Other important factors are i) the quantity and quality of resources 
(including infrastructures and teachers) invested at the school level, ii) the strength of peer-effects, iii) personal 
attitudes and expectations towards education. In order to guarantee EOp in education, the public sector should 
                                           
11  The ex-ante perspective is coherent with the reward principle since it aims at equalizing the treatment of individuals with equal ex-
ante endowments. 
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make sure that sufficient resources to insure decent standards of education exist in all schools, and that 
additional resources are spent where they are mostly needed (for instance in schools characterized by a large 
presence of students from under-privileged background). Peer-effects tend to generate inequality to the extent 
that students are clustered by socio-economic background. For this reason, it is important to insure that students 
from different backgrounds are mixed as early as possible. The cultural climate at home is also an important 
source of inequality, since it affects students' attitudes and expectations. Policies directed at informing students 
–and their families- of the benefits from attending tertiary education, together with quotas, have proven quite 
successful in increasing participation to tertiary education by under-privileged students.  
2.4 Related concepts 
So far, we have discussed the different interpretations underlying the idea of equality of opportunity 
contemplated in the EOp theory. However, the sociological and economic literatures have developed alternative 
concepts. They are, in principle, meant to measure the same phenomenon, however they may differ under 
relevant aspects. 
2.4.1 Meritocracy 
The first related concept is meritocracy. According to the meritocratic view, equality of opportunity would prevail 
in a situation in which people with identical levels of effort and choices enjoy identical outcomes. A meritocratic 
approach to equality of opportunities would put in place policies that insure that to the same level of effort 
correspond equal outcomes. While it does not directly addresses the role of circumstances, by focussing on 
effort, this concept is close to the ex-post perspective: inequality arising from different efforts is ethically 
justifiable. At the same time, meritocracy diverges from ex-post EOp because it neglects the indirect effect of 
circumstances on the final outcome. In fact, while meritocracy considers only the "level" of effort, ex-post 
equality of opportunity is concerned with guaranteeing equal outcome to those that exert the same "degree" of 
effort 12. 
In essence, meritocratic policies tend to provide a reward to effort independently from the direct or indirect role 
that circumstances (in the meaning of EOp) might play. Policies aiming at improving EOp, on the other hand, 
explicitly recognize that circumstances play an important role in determining the relationship between effort 
and outcomes and that disadvantaged circumstances should be either eliminated or compensated for.  
Meritocracy and ex post EOp coincide only when effort is stochastically independent of circumstances. In 
general, this is not the case. Assume that outcome is represented by earnings, which depend on the educational 
effort (educational attainment, number of hours dedicated to study), but which could also be affected by other 
factors (age, gender, race, social background, etc.). At the same time, educational effort, in general, depends on 
circumstances, such as the parental education. In this case it can be safely stated that effort (as a measure of 
merit) is partly due to circumstances. A meritocratic policy maker would focus on insuring that factors different 
from education do not play a role in wage determination (i.e. avoid any type of wage discrimination based on 
race, gender, social background, conditional on a given educational level). On the other hand, a policy maker 
concerned with EOp would recognize that circumstances play an important role in the determination of 
educational achievement, and would hence try to minimize their role, making sure that returns to effort are 
equalized across different types.  
                                           
12 See the discussion in BOX 1. 
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In general, a policymaker endorsing an EOp perspective would level the playing field before the competition for 
social resources takes place, while a meritocratic policymaker would do it at the competition stage. Hence, a 
meritocratic policy would allocate social resources by directing them only to those exerting the highest level of 
effort. It is likely that individuals in the most disadvantaged types will be excluded by the target of this policy 
because their level of effort is lower, even though they have tried equally hard (they started from a 
disadvantaged set of circumstances). On the other hand, an EOp policy would sacrifice efficiency by allocating 
some additional resources to compensate individuals for their disadvantage. For example, according to the 
meritocratic view, only the students that do well in secondary school or in admission tests would be admitted 
to university; whereas, according to the EOp view, admission should go beyond pure merit and evaluate relative 
merit on the basis of students external characteristics (i.e. types)13.  
Meritocracy weakens the issue of being fair with respect to individuals characterized by different circumstances, 
strengthening, instead, the issue of preserving the incentive to exert more effort. This observation poses the 
issue of defining the amount of compensation when resources must be assigned according to merit. A trade-
off between meritocracy and equality of opportunity might arise if specific social positions were assigned to 
individuals who may not be equally efficient in producing outputs for that society. A solution could be to adopt 
a combination of the two principles. For instance, one could adopt an EOp policy in the preliminary stage of 
education and formation, and a meritocratic policy in the following stage on the selection of candidates for 
jobs14. Beside the different treatment of circumstances in the context of meritocracy and EOp, there are other 
situations in which, even if one adopted an EOp perspective, the policy implications would tend to be analogous 
to those of meritocracy. In fact, we can argue that by expanding or restricting the set of circumstances one can 
get further away or closer to from meritocracy. The example of talent is illuminating. Talent is the product of 
nature and upbringing, and hence should be considered as a circumstance, at least up to a person's adolescence. 
In this case, and taking an EOp perspective, it should be concluded that differences in talent should be 
compensated for. On the other hand, if talent is not considered as a circumstance, a meritocratic interpretation 
of EOp would arise, since it would not be necessary to compensate persons for their low talent. A similar logic 
would apply to health status (but in this case most would indeed include it among the circumstances). This is a 
standard issue when the outcome is represented by education. Should an educational system reinforce 
differences in talent, by rewarding talent, or instead compensate for them, considering it as a circumstance? In 
the former case, education resources should be distributed to those who can make the most use of them, and 
therefore redistribution should reward the joint effect of talent and effort (see Brunori et al., 2013).  
Opposed to the concept of meritocracy and talent is the concept of discrimination, which can be considered an 
additional source of inequality of opportunity. Discrimination arises when individuals equally endowed in terms 
of talent and productivity face legal barriers to an equal treatment. An example is represented by the wage 
gap, or the different access to the best jobs, between social groups with equivalent educational background and 
qualifications (e.g. white vs black wage gap; male vs female wage gap). According to this view, EOp would arise 
in a situation where equally deserving individuals are treated equally15. 
2.4.2 Intergenerational mobility 
Intergenerational mobility is a concept often employed by the economic literature to investigate the issue of 
equality of opportunity. It is undeniable that more mobile societies might be able to grant more equality of 
opportunity, however the two concepts should be kept separate. 
Relative intergenerational mobility can be interpreted as the extent to which individuals move up or down the 
social ladder relative to their parents' position. It is close to the ex-ante perspective of EOp because it does not 
account for the effect of effort on the final outcome. However, the two concepts differ inasmuch as the standard 
EOp approach is based on a definition of a list of circumstances that goes beyond parental income. 
Intergenerational mobility would be equivalent to ex-ante EOp if and only if the set of circumstances affecting 
the outcome of individuals were restricted to parents' income (or social status). When the set of circumstances 
is broadened to account for other exogenous factors, it is reasonable to believe that a measure of mobility 
would be able to capture only part of the inequality of opportunity arising in the society. 
The policy implications of such divergence are clear-cut. A policymaker aiming at maximizing intergenerational 
mobility would not be concerned with the issue of fairly rewarding individuals for their effort (similarly to the 
ex-ante perspective). At the same time, the compensation scheme would be based only on individuals' parental 
status, while being neutral with respect to differences arising from race or region of birth, for example. A further 
point of discontinuity is that it would allocate resources to more immobile individuals, even though the state of 
immobility is the result of low effort. 
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Recent contributions however propose new concepts and measures of mobility, more consistent with the EOp 
idea16. These frameworks enable to control for a broader set of circumstances and to disentangle the part of 
mobility that is effectively acting as an equalizer of opportunities from that part due to change in the individual 
effort. 
2.4.3 Intergenerational equity 
The theory of equality of opportunity has been moved forward by the 2006 World Development Report (World 
Bank, 2006), advancing a new definition of equity, as a state in which two conditions should be verified. The 
first is the equalization of the opportunities for individuals to realize the life of their choosing; the second is the 
avoidance of extreme poverty (even though this state might be the result of low effort). According to this 
principle, equality of opportunity would arise in a situation where opportunities for all types are maximized. 
The idea underlying this concept is that inequalities have two main dramatic effects: the violation of people's 
concern for fairness and the costs for the development process, in terms of inefficiencies and wasted economic 
potential. Greater equity is morally desirable because it incorporate fairness concern; but it is also instrumentally 
complementary to long-run growth and prosperity because it contrasts the formation of poverty and inequality 
traps, with the immediate result that the benefits for the poorer and excluded groups are doubled: overall 
resources grow and the poor can have access to a larger share of them. 
From this perspective, an equity policy should be aimed at breaking inequality traps and supporting aggregate 
growth, by paying attention to specific inequalities and their interactions with markets, social structure and 
power.     
In this vein, an equity policy should be targeted to protect people's human capacities from the start of people's 
lives and through adulthood. These interventions encompass: early childhood development programs, to 
enhance a child's life chances and mitigate the intergenerational transmission of poverty and inequality; 
interventions in education, such as higher public spending on the supply of schools, by ensuring to children from 
different backgrounds affordable access and the same opportunity of benefiting from quality education. A 
second target is ensuring equitable access to justice and complementary assets and introducing fairness policies 
in the markets, such as financial, labour and product markets. These interventions are crucial for constraining 
the power of the political and economic elite and avoiding discrimination. 
 
                                           
13  See Betts and Roemer (1999). 
14  Think at the selection criteria to cover a particular job position, surgeon, for example. Given the impact of this job on social welfare, 
society would sacrify equality of opportunity and endorse pure meritocracy. But it would support equality of opportunity for the access 
to medicine at university. 
15  Discrimination is the focus of a quite different branch of the literature. For additional details the reader can refer to Borjas (2009). 
16  See Van de gaer et al. (2001), Ruiz-Castillo (2003) and Palmisano (2011). 
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2.4.4 Human Opportunity Index 
The most recent interpretation of equality of opportunity can be inferred from the Human Opportunity Index 
(de Barros et al., 2009). This framework focuses on the unfair allocation of basic opportunities. Here, basic 
opportunities refer to those goods and services that are critical in determining opportunities for economic 
advancement in life and are exogenous from the point of view of the individual (i.e. access to them is controlled 
by the family or by society). This form of inequality may take place early in life, (e.g. access to education, health, 
nutrition, and basic services), or later (e.g. tertiary education, life-long learning and health). 
Children who cannot access basic opportunities might be not allowed to fully utilize their talents with the 
consequence of a suboptimal accumulation of human and physical capital, which eventually has an impact on 
outcomes. 
The HOI captures two aspects: (i) the extent to which the basic functionings17necessary for children's 
development are available in a given time/place, and (ii) the extent to which access to those functionings 
depends upon exogenous circumstances.   
The HOI stands out as a tool able to express, within the same framework, the extent of the aggregate 
opportunities in a given country and the extent of fairness in the distribution of these opportunities. According 
to this approach, there is equality of opportunity if the distribution of basic goods and services is not correlated 
with circumstances and the access to these basic needs is expanded as much as possible. A society will instead 
be characterized by inequality of opportunity if some children do not have access to goods and services 
instrumental to satisfy basic needs and if the extent of access is determined by factors for which a child cannot 
be held responsible. Hence, EOp would prevail in a situation where all children are given equal access to the 
basic goods and services that are necessary for their development, which is instrumental to the attainment of 
any final level of outcome desired when they are adult. 
This approach differs in several aspects from the standard EOp theory. The first difference is represented by 
the space of evaluation: the basic functionings for the HOI and the outcome(s) for the EOp theory. Second, the 
HOI captures the nature of inequality in access to basic opportunities, as opposed to the overall inequality of 
opportunity defined in the standard approach. This is justified by the idea that by expanding access to basic 
goods and services (independently from circumstances) will reduce the overall effect of circumstances on the 
income received by that person in adult age. However, this implies that the HOI captures inequality in access to 
basic opportunities between groups of individuals with different circumstances, rather than the overall 
inequality in the access to basic goods. It expresses neutrality with respect to inequality in the access to basic 
needs among individuals with the same circumstances. Therefore, it can be considered as a lower bound 
estimate of the total inequality in access to basic needs. 
A policy coherent with this approach should ensure equal conditions for access to goods and services directed 
at satisfying basic needs. For instance, specific sets of social services should be provided to all. These policies 
should be implemented to increase access to basic opportunities and to ensure that their provision is not 
systematically biased against any specific group or type of individuals. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
17  In Sens' language a functioning is what an individual does or is. In other words, functionings are the states and activities that constitute 
the essence of a person. 
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3 Measuring IOp  
The measurement of (in)equality of opportunity (IOp) represents a crucial issue for the realistic implementation 
of an opportunity egalitarian policy. Measurement of IOp is necessary to identify the part of the population 
most in need, to allow comparisons across countries and time, to discover the best practices that can be 
replicated in different contexts.   
Different methods are available to measure the degree of inequality of opportunity in a distribution. They can 
be classified in two main categories18: index-based and stochastic dominance approaches19. Before we discuss 
them in detail, it is important to notice that, in empirical analysis, researchers have to deal with the impossibility 
of observing opportunity sets (a problem that does not affect theoretical contributions). Hence, empirical 
analyses try to derive conclusions about opportunity sets from the observation of actual outcomes. This can be 
done because a relationship between circumstances and effort, on the one hand, and outcome, on the other 
one, is assumed. By observing outcome and making appropriate assumptions on the distribution of effort, it is 
possible to derive a (counterfactual) distribution of (unobservable) equality of opportunities. In particular, 
researchers adopting an ex-ante approach typically start from the selection of the circumstances, and then 
investigate how much of the observed inequality in the outcome variable (e.g., income, wealth, educational 
attainment, health status) can be accounted for by circumstances: the higher is the share of observed inequality 
that can be traced back to circumstances and the higher is the part of observed inequality that is due to lack 
of equality of opportunity. The move from equality to inequality of opportunity permits the use of the statistical 
techniques developed to measure inequality. Since the circumstances used in the empirical analysis are just a 
subset of the factors that in practice influence people's opportunities, the estimates for IOp represent a lower 
bound of actual Inequality of opportunity   
3.1 Indices of IOp 
The prevailing index-based approach aims at evaluating the extent of inequality of opportunity in a society by 
applying an index of inequality, denoted by 𝑰𝑰, to a counterfactual distribution of an outcome variable (e.g. 
income) denoted by 𝒙𝒙�, which is obtained transforming the individual outcome such that the inequality due to 
effort is eliminated and the only inequality left is the inequality due to circumstances: 
 𝐈𝐈𝐈𝐈𝐈𝐈𝐈𝐈𝐈𝐈𝐈𝐈𝐈𝐈𝐈𝐈𝐈𝐈𝐈𝐈 𝐨𝐨𝐨𝐨 𝐨𝐨𝐨𝐨𝐨𝐨𝐨𝐨𝐨𝐨𝐈𝐈𝐈𝐈𝐈𝐈𝐈𝐈𝐈𝐈𝐈𝐈 = 𝑰𝑰(𝒙𝒙�)   (2) 
 
It is useful to recall that the ex-ante perspective focuses on inequality between types, that is, on the inequality 
among the set of opportunities open to individuals with different circumstances. Ex-post inequality of 
opportunity focuses on inequality within tranches, that is on the inequality of the outcome enjoyed by individuals 
exerting the same degree of effort but belonging to different types. Consequently, the construction of the 
counterfactual distributions depends on the perspective adopted. In addition, the literature proposes different - 
non-parametric and parametric - solutions to derive them. 
For simplicity, treat effort 𝑒𝑒, as well as each element of the vector of circumstances, 𝐶𝐶, as discrete variables.  
Then a given population can be partitioned in two ways: into types 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 , within which all individuals share the 
same circumstances, and into tranches 𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗 , within which everyone shares the same degree of effort. Denote by 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  the income generated by circumstances 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 and effort 𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗 . Suppose, in addition, that there are 𝑛𝑛 types, indexed 
by ni ,...,1= ,  and 𝑚𝑚 tranches, indexed by mj ,...,1= . In this discrete setting20, the population can be 
represented by a matrix �𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗� with 𝑛𝑛 rows, corresponding to types, and 𝑚𝑚  columns, corresponding to tranches: 
see Table 1.  
                                           
18  See Ferreira and Peragine (2016) and Ramos and Van de gaer (2016) for a detailed and comprehensive survey on this topic. 
19  Others approaches borrowed from the fairness allocation theory are based on the comparisons between the actual distribution and 
the norm distribution. See Devooght (2008) and Almas et al. (2011). 
20     In an alternative formulation, that would treat effort as a continuous variable, ( )xFi  would denote the advantage distribution in type 
i and iq  denote its population share. The overall distribution for the population as a whole would be ( ) ( )∑
=
=
n
i
ii xFqxF
1
.  
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Table 1. Distribution of outcomes according to circumstances and effort. 
 
 𝑒𝑒1 𝑒𝑒2 𝑒𝑒3 … 𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚 
𝐶𝐶1 𝑥𝑥11 𝑥𝑥12 𝑥𝑥13 … 𝑥𝑥1𝑚𝑚 
𝐶𝐶2 𝑥𝑥21 𝑥𝑥22 𝑥𝑥23 … 𝑥𝑥2𝑚𝑚 
𝐶𝐶3 𝑥𝑥31 𝑥𝑥32 𝑥𝑥33 … 𝑥𝑥3𝑚𝑚 
… … … … … … 
𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛1 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛2 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛3 … 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚 
 
The measurement of inequality of opportunity can be thought of as a two-step procedure21: first, the actual 
distribution �𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗� is transformed into a counterfactual distribution [𝑋𝑋� ij] that reflects only and fully the unfair 
inequality in �𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗�, while all the fair inequality is removed. In the second step, a measure of inequality22 is 
applied to [𝑋𝑋� ij], to obtain 𝐼𝐼(𝑥𝑥�). In principle, the construction of the counterfactual distribution [𝑋𝑋� ij] should reflect 
both the compensation and the reward principles – the two subcomponents of opportunity egalitarianism. 
Below we review two of the most influential measurement approaches proposed in the literature: the first 
subscribes to an ex-ante view of compensation - “between-types inequality”– while the second pursues the ex-
post compensation principle – “within-tranches inequality”. 
Versions of the between-types inequality approach were variously proposed by Peragine (2002, 2004a, 2004b), 
Bourguignon, et al. (2007), Checchi and Peragine (2010) and Ferreira and Gignoux (2011). The approach is 
inspired by the "min of means" criterion proposed by Van de gaer (1993). The counterfactual distribution is 
obtained by replacing each individual income 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  by the average income of the type she belongs to. This 
smoothing transformation is intended to remove all inequality within types. Formally:  
Between types �𝑋𝑋�𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵�: For all 𝑗𝑗 ∈ {1, … … ,𝑚𝑚} and for all 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1, … … ,𝑚𝑚}, 𝑥𝑥�𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 . 
Table 2. Between-types inequality (𝑛𝑛 = 𝑚𝑚 = 3). 
 
 𝑒𝑒1 𝑒𝑒2 𝑒𝑒3 
𝐶𝐶1 𝜇𝜇1 𝜇𝜇1 𝜇𝜇1 
𝐶𝐶2 𝜇𝜇2 𝜇𝜇2 𝜇𝜇2 
𝐶𝐶3 𝜇𝜇3 𝜇𝜇3 𝜇𝜇3 
 
By making use of standard inequality decomposition techniques (Theil, 1979a, 1979b; Bourguignon, 1979), 
some authors (notably Checchi and Peragine, 2010 and Ferreira and Gignoux, 2011) have used this approach 
to propose a useful decomposition of overall inequality into two terms: between types inequality, to be 
interpreted as inequality of opportunity, and within types inequality, interpreted as inequality due to effort.  
Let us turn now to the ex-post measurement approach. Inspired by Roemer’s (1993) "mean of mins" criterion, 
Checchi and Peragine (2010) and Aaberge et al. (2011) propose the within-tranches counterfactual distribution 
                                           
21  For an extensive survey on the different approaches and methodologies that have been proposed for the measurement of inequality 
of opportunity see Ferreira and Peragine (2016) and Ramos and Van de gaer (2016).  
22  This section focuses on inequality measures. For different approaches based on dominance analyses, which give more robust but 
incomplete rankings, see Peragine (2002, 2004a, 2004b), Peragine and Serlenga (2008), Rodriguez (2008).  
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(𝑋𝑋�𝑊𝑊𝐵𝐵𝑊𝑊), which is obtained by replacing each individual outcome 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  in a given tranche with the ratio between 
such outcome and the average income of that tranche: 𝜈𝜈𝑗𝑗 = ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 . This normalization procedure is 
intended to remove all inequalities between tranches and to leave unchanged the inequality within tranches. 
Formally, 
Within tranches (𝑋𝑋�𝑊𝑊𝐵𝐵𝑊𝑊): For all 𝑗𝑗 ∈ {1, … … ,𝑚𝑚} and for all 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1, … … ,𝑚𝑚}, 𝑥𝑥𝚤𝚤𝚤𝚤� = 𝑔𝑔(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖  , 𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗)/𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗 . 
Table 3. Within tranches inequality (𝑛𝑛 = 𝑚𝑚 = 3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is easy to see that the within-tranches measure is consistent with ex-post compensation: each tranche is 
obtained simply by rescaling original incomes by a constant (1/𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗). Therefore 𝑋𝑋�𝑊𝑊𝐵𝐵𝑊𝑊   accounts for all of the 
original (relative) inequality within tranches. On the other hand, it does not capture inequality between tranches. 
Also in this case Checchi and Peragine (2010) propose a useful decomposition of overall inequality into two 
terms: within tranches inequality, to be interpreted as inequality of opportunity, and between tranches 
inequality, interpreted as inequality due to effort. 
Some studies have tried to compare estimates of ex-post and ex-ante IOp (Aaberge et al., 2011; Cogneau and 
Mesplé-Somps, 2008), showing how the results from the two approaches differ.  
The parametric solution put forward to evaluate ex-ante inequality of opportunity consists, instead, in evaluating 
the opportunity set as the result of estimation, through regression analysis, of a particular specification of the 
function 𝒈𝒈(∙) in eq. (1)23. Assuming that 𝒈𝒈(∙) is linear, one would estimate  
𝒙𝒙 = 𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄 + 𝝐𝝐        (3) 
which would produce an estimate 𝒄𝒄� for the parameter governing the "impact" of circumstances on outcomes. 
Then, by applying  𝒄𝒄�  to the individual-specific values of observable circumstances one would obtain the 
predicted outcome for each individual. This would be depured of the effect of effort (and other individual 
idiosyncratic elements) and could then be used to construct a counterfactual distribution, to be used to generate 
a measure of IOp. This procedure eliminates within-type inequality and is, thus, consistent with an ex-ante 
evaluation of inequality of opportunity (see Ferreira and Gignoux, 2011, who propose this methodology to 
evaluate inequality of opportunity for six Latin American countries24). 
As for the ex-post evaluation, a counterfactual can be obtained by estimating, through regression analysis, the 
level of outcome that each individual would enjoy by exerting a reference level of effort, given her 
circumstances25. Usually the mean value for effort in the sample is taken as reference (see Pistolesi, 2009, who 
implements this approach to analyse the evolution of opportunity inequality in the U.S. between 1968 and 2001, 
using PSID data26 and using averaged earnings as outcome variable). 
 
                                           
23  Assuming that circumstances and effort are correlated, the function estimated to evaluate the opportunity set of individual 𝑘𝑘 is 
𝑔𝑔𝑘𝑘(𝑐𝑐𝑘𝑘 ,𝑢𝑢𝑘𝑘), where 𝑢𝑢𝑘𝑘 is the random component and is assumed equal to 0, so that the effect of effort is taken over by circumstances. 
24  They use household income per capita as a measure of outcome and the mean log deviation as a measure of inequality. Circumstances 
are represented by parental education, father's occupation, ethnicity and region of birth. According to their results, Brazil is the most 
opportunity unequal, followed by Guatemala, Panama, Peru, Ecuador and Columbia. 
25  The function estimated is 𝑔𝑔𝑘𝑘(𝑐𝑐𝑘𝑘 , 𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑘𝑟𝑟 ,𝑢𝑢𝑘𝑘), where 𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟 is the reference level of effort and 𝑢𝑢𝑘𝑘 is the random component. 
26  Circumstances are represented by age, parents' year of education, father's occupation, ethnicity and region of birth. He finds that 
inequality of opportunity represents between 20% and 43% of earnings inequality, but decreases all over the period reaching around 
18% in 2001 
 𝑒𝑒1 𝑒𝑒2 𝑒𝑒3 
𝐶𝐶1 𝑥𝑥11/𝜈𝜈1 𝑥𝑥12/𝜈𝜈2 𝑥𝑥13/𝜈𝜈3 
𝐶𝐶2 𝑥𝑥21/𝜈𝜈1 𝑥𝑥22/𝜈𝜈2 𝑥𝑥23/𝜈𝜈3 
𝐶𝐶3 𝑥𝑥31/𝜈𝜈1 𝑥𝑥32/𝜈𝜈2 𝑥𝑥33/𝜈𝜈3 
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3.2 Stochastic dominance approach 
A further approach to measure inequality of opportunity uses stochastic dominance tools. This approach is 
based on the observation that the value of an individual's opportunity set increases as the outcome of the 
individuals belonging to his type increases. This suggests that ex-ante inequality of opportunity can be 
established when some type's cumulative distribution function of income first-order stochastically dominates 
another type's cumulative distribution function. Hence, the absence of first-order stochastic dominance between 
type's cumulative distribution functions can be used as a test for ex-ante equal opportunities27. This approach 
is proposed and used by Lefranc et al. (2008) to evaluate inequality of opportunity in nine Western countries, 
using pre-tax disposable income as the outcome variable and social background as circumstances28. 
 
                                           
27  If inequality averse reward principle is satisfied, absence of first order stochastic dominance can be strengthened to the requirement 
of absence of second order stochastic dominance between types. 
28  Sweden is the country performing better, followed by West Germany, Great Britain, Belgium and Norway, while Italy, France, 
Netherland and U.S. are the countries performing worse. 
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4 Empirical applications  
Although rapidly flourishing, some aspects are still limiting the expansion of the literature in the empirical field. 
The most (but not the only) relevant issues relate to the difficulties involved in finding variables that describe 
circumstances satisfactorily and to the identification of effort. 
As for the first issue, in principle, there can be agreements to define exactly what are the pre-determined 
characteristics that, while being outside individuals' control, directly affect individual outcome(s). However, in 
practice, their complete identification is prevented by the availability of data and the impossibility of observing 
the whole set of exogenous characteristics. In general, the set of circumstances observed in any particular 
dataset is likely to be a sub-set of all the possible circumstances that determine a person's outcome. The larger 
is the set of circumstances, the higher is inequality of opportunity. The direct implication is that, due to partial 
observability, one might end up underestimating the level of inequality of opportunity. Hence, empirical 
estimates based on data that present this drawback, should be interpreted as lower-bound estimates of the 
effective inequality of opportunity. 
The second issue concerns the possible correlation between effort and circumstances. According to the EOp 
view, if effort is determined by circumstances, the inequality arising from different effort levels should also be 
questioned. Therefore, in order to have a reliable estimation of the part of inequality due to exogenous 
characteristics, the researcher needs to depurate effort from the effect of circumstances. One solution is 
represented by the methodology proposed in BOX 1. 
4.1 Absolute vs relative measures 
As discussed in section 3.1, the between-types measure of inequality of opportunity 𝐼𝐼(𝑥𝑥�𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵) is a version of the 
ex-ante approach that computes inequality over the counterfactual distribution where each individual’s outcome 
is replaced by the mean of the values of the outcome variable for each type 𝑘𝑘, 𝜇𝜇(𝑘𝑘). The between-types 
measure 𝐼𝐼(𝑥𝑥�𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵) has been applied by a number of authors. Most of them, following Checchi and Peragine (2010) 
and Ferreira and Gignoux (2011), use the mean logarithmic deviation, but in a few cases the Gini index, the 
Theil (T) index and even the variance have been adopted.   
Brunori et al. (2013) consider eight studies - Checchi et al. (2016); Ferreira and Gignoux (2011); Ferreira et al. 
(2011); Pistolesi (2009); Singh (2012); Belhaj-Hassine (2012), Cogneau and Mesple-Somps (2008) and Piraino 
(2015) – and compare actual IOp measures across forty-one countries, ranging from Guinea and Madagascar, 
with annual per capita GNIs of PPP$980, to Luxembourg, with a per capita GNI of almost PPP$ 64,000. We now 
briefly review their results. 
Since in all of these studies the advantage indicator is proxied by a measure of economic well-being - household 
per capita income, household per capita consumption, or individual labor earnings - Brunori et al. (2013) refer 
to the between-types measure of IOp in these studies as an index of Inequality of Economic Opportunity (IEO). 
In practice, this index is presented in two alternative versions: i) the absolute or level estimate of inequality of 
opportunity (IEOL), expressed by the between-types inequality measure introduced above, that is 𝐼𝐼(𝑥𝑥�𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵); ii) the 
ratio of IEOL to overall inequality in the relevant outcome variable, which yields the relative measure, IEOR: 
 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 𝐼𝐼(𝑥𝑥�𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵)
𝐼𝐼(𝑥𝑥)  (4) 
IEOR informs directly on the percentage of observed inequality in the outcome variables that is accounted for 
by inequality of opportunity. 
The partition of types varies across studies, ranging from 6 to 7,680 types (although in four of the eight studies, 
the range is a more comfortable 72-108 types). Since in some cases the datasets are not large enough to yield 
precise estimates of the mean  𝜇𝜇𝑘𝑘 for all types, some authors compute IEOL using the parametric approximation 
discussed in Section 3.1. Parametric estimates are also presented either as levels (IEOL) or ratios (IEOR). This 
approach follows Ferreira and Gignoux (2011), which in turn draws on Bourguignon et al. (2007). Empirically, 
parametric estimates of inequality of opportunity tend to be a little lower than their non-parametric 
counterparts but, at least in the case of Latin America, the differences are not large: proportional differences 
between the two average 6.6% in Ferreira and Gignoux (2011). 
These empirical estimates of "between-types" IOp - whether estimated parametrically or non-parametrically – 
represents lower-bound estimates of inequality of opportunity and this can be easily understood by considering 
that the set of circumstances empirically observed is a strict subset of the set of all circumstance variables that 
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matter in reality29. 
Recently, an upper-bound estimator of between-types inequality of opportunity has also been proposed, 
requiring panel data sets where the same individuals - or households - are observed at different points in time. 
Niehues and Peichl (2014) show that if all circumstances are time-invariant (e.g., because they are determined 
at birth), the share of inequality associated with individual fixed effects in such data can provide an upper-
bound estimate for between-types IOp. Intuitively, if all circumstances are time-invariant, their contribution to 
inequality is fully captured by the fixed effects. If, in addition, some component of individual responsibility (or 
effort) is also time-invariant, then that estimate is upwardly-biased - hence an upper bound. One limitation of 
this approach is that it rules out the existence of time-varying circumstances, such as later brute luck. 
Table 4 (reported from Brunori et al., 2013) presents the estimates of IEOL and IEOR for the forty-one countries 
analyzed in the eight aforementioned papers. The table also lists their gross national income (GNI) per capita 
and overall income inequality, the last one being measured by whatever index was used in the construction of 
the IEO indices for each country. Except where indicated, this measure was the mean logarithmic deviation, also 
known as the Theil-I index, a member of the generalized entropy class of inequality measures. While overall 
inequality, IEOL and IEOR come from the eight studies mentioned above, GNI per capita comes from the World 
Bank's World Development Indicators database. 
Table 4. Inequality of opportunity and income inequality in 41 countries. 
Country GNI per capita PPP Total inequality IEO-L IEO-R 
Austria (1) 39,410 0.1800 0.0390 0.2167 
Belgium (1) 37,840 0.1450 0.0250 0.1724 
Brazil (3) 10,920 0.6920 0.2230 0.3223 
Colombia (3) 9,000 0.5720 0.1330 0.2325 
Cyprus (1) 30,160 0.1700 0.0510 0.3000 
Czec Rep. (1) 23,620 0.1760 0.0190 0.1080 
Denmark (1) 40,140 0.0830 0.0120 0.1446 
Ecuador (3) 9,270 0.5800 0.1500 0.2586 
Egypt (5) 5,910 0.4230 0.0491 0.1160 
Estonia (1) 19,500 0.2430 0.0260 0.1070 
Finland (1) 37,180 0.1360 0.0130 0.0956 
France (1) 34,440 0.1630 0.0210 0.1288 
Germany (1) 38,170 0.1910 0.0350 0.1832 
Ghana (2) 1,600 0.4000 0.0450 0.1125 
Greece (1) 27,360 0.2000 0.0340 0.1700 
Guatemala (3) 4,610 0.5930 0.1990 0.3356 
Guinea (2) 980 0.4200 0.0560 0.1333 
Hungary (1) 19,280 0.2080 0.0210 0.1010 
                                           
29  For a formal proof of the lower-bound result, see Ferreira and Gignoux (2011). 
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India (8) 3,560 0.4218 0.0822 0.1949 
Ireland (1) 32,740 0.1880 0.0420 0.2234 
Italy (1) 31,090 0.1960 0.0280 0.1429 
Ivory Coast (2) 1,650 0.3700 0.0500 0.1351 
Latvia (1) 16,360 0.2290 0.0280 0.1223 
Lithuania (1) 17,880 0.2280 0.0350 0.1535 
Luxemburg (1) 63,850 0.1480 0.0350 0.2365 
Madagascar (2) 980 0.4400 0.0920 0.2091 
Netherlands (1) 42,580 0.1920 0.0360 0.1875 
Norway (1) 57,130 0.1300 0.0030 0.0231 
Panama (3) 12,980 0.6300 0.1900 0.3016 
Peru (3) 8,940 0.5570 0.1560 0.2801 
Poland (1) 19,020 0.2710 0.0250 0.0923 
Portugal (1) 24,710 0.2470 0.0300 0.1215 
Slovakia (1) 23,140 0.1320 0.0180 0.1364 
Slovenia (1) 26,970 0.1040 0.0050 0.0481 
South Africa (6) 10,280 0.6750 0.1690 0.2504 
Spain (1) 31,550 0.2160 0.0420 0.1944 
Sweden (1) 39,600 0.1060 0.0120 0.1132 
Turkey (4) 14,580 0.3620 0.0948 0.2620 
Uganda (2) 1,230 0.4300 0.0400 0.0930 
UK (1) 36,580 0.2040 0.0420 0.2059 
 US (7)  47,020 0.2200 0.0409 0.1860 
Source: Brunori et al. (2013) 
(1) Checchi et al. (2016) 
(2) Cogneau and and Mesple-Somps (2008) 
(3) Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) 
(4) Ferreira et al. (2011) 
(5) Belhaj-Hassine (2012) 
(6) Piraino (2015) 
(7) Pistolesi (2009) 
(8) Singh (2012) 
Note: The source for inequality and IEO measures for each country is given in parentheses after the country's name. GNI per capita is taken 
from the World Bank's World Development Indicators, for the year 2010, using PPP exchange rates for 2005. Total inequality is measured 
by the mean logarithmic deviation in all cases except those from source (2), which use the Theil-T index. IEO indices are always based on 
the same inequality measure used for total inequality in that country. 
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Table 4 should be read together with Table 5, which describes the countries studied in each paper, the specific 
data sets, the income and circumstance variables used, whether the estimation was parametric or otherwise, 
and the number of types included. The table highlights a number of problems for comparability across these 
studies.  
First, as discussed above, the nature of the outcome variable adopted is different: Pistolesi (2009), Singh (2012) 
and Belhaj-Hassine (2012) use labor earnings, Checchi et al. (2016), Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) and Piraino 
(2015) use incomes, Cogneau and Mesple-Somps (2008) use consumption, and Ferreira et al. (2011) use 
imputed consumption. These distinctions are not immaterial: in a comparison of six Latin American countries, 
Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) found substantially higher estimates of IEOR for consumption expenditure than 
for income distributions, in the same countries. In the same vein, Bourguignon et al. (2007) found differences 
between estimates for individual earnings and for household per capita incomes.     
Second, the studies differ in the number of types used for the decomposition and in the exact set of 
circumstances used in each case. At one extreme, the Cogneau and Mesple-Somps study for Uganda has 3 
types based on father's occupation and education levels; on the other Pistolesi has 7,680 types, constructed on 
the basis of information on age, parental education, occupational group of the father, individual ethnic group, 
and individual region of birth. Fortunately, there is a core set of studies - which account for most countries in 
the sample - with 72 to 108 types each.  
Finally, a third comparability caveat depends on the fact that some studies use non-parametric estimates while 
others use parametric ones. 
 
Table 5. Comparing eight studies of ex-ante inequality of opportunity across 41 countries. 
 
References Countries Data sources Outcome 
 
Method 
 
 
Circumstances 
 
Number 
of types 
1 
Checchi et 
al. (2016) 
Austria, 
Belgium, 
Czech 
Republic, 
Germany, 
Denmark, 
Estonia, 
Greece, 
Spain, 
Finland, 
France, 
Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, 
Lithuania, 
Latvia, 
Netherlands, 
Norway, 
Poland, 
Portugal, 
Sweden, 
Slovenia, 
Slovakia, 
United 
Kingdom 
EU-Silc 2005 
post-tax 
individual 
incomes 
parametric 
parental 
education, 
parental 
occupation, 
gender, 
nationality, 
geographical 
location 
72 
2  
Cogneau 
and Mesple-
Somps 
(2008) 
Ivory Coast, 
Ghana, 
Guinea, 
Madagascar, 
Uganda 
Ivory Coast, 
EPAMCI, 
1985-88 
Ghana, 
1998, GLSS 
Guinea, 
1994, EICVM 
Madagascar, 
1993, EPAM 
Uganda, 
1992, NIHS 
per capita 
household 
consumption 
non parametric 
3 groups based 
on father’s 
occupation and 
education, 
region of birth 
6 (3 
Uganda) 
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3  
Ferreira and 
Gignoux 
(2011) 
Brazil, 
Colombia, 
Ecuador, 
Guatemala, 
Panama, 
Peru 
Brazil, PNAD 
1996; 
Colombia, 
ECV 2003; 
Ecuador ECV 
2006; 
Guatemala, 
ENCOVI 
2000; 
Panama, 
ENV 2003; 
Peru, ENAHO 
2001 
household 
per capita 
income 
parametric 
gender, 
ethnicity, 
parental 
education, 
father’s 
occupation, 
region of birth. 
108 (54 
Peru) 
4  
Ferreira et 
al. (2011) Turkey 
TDHS 2003-
2004 and 
HBS 2003 
imputed per 
capita 
consumption 
parametric 
urban/rural, 
region of birth, 
parental 
education, 
mother tongue, 
number of 
sibling 
768 
5  
Belhaj-
Hassine 
(2012) 
Egypt ELMPS 2006 total monthly earning non parametric 
gender, 
father’s 
education, 
mother’s 
education, 
father’s 
occupation, 
region of birth. 
72 
6  
Piraino 
(2015) South Africa 
NIDS 2008-
2010 
Individual 
gross income parametric 
race, father's 
education 24 
7  
Pistolesi 
(2009) US PSID 2001 
individual 
annual 
earnings 
semiparametric 
age, parental 
education, 
father's 
occupation, 
ethnicity, 
region of birth 
7,680 
8  
Singh 
(2012) India 
IHDS 2004–
2005 
household 
per capita 
earnings 
parametric 
father’s 
education, 
father’s 
occupation, 
caste, religion, 
geographical 
area of 
residence. 
108 
Source: Brunori et al. (2013)  
Bearing these caveats in mind, Table 4 nevertheless illustrates the substantial variation in inequality levels - 
both in outcomes and in opportunities - across countries. The mean log deviation for the outcome indicator 
ranges from 0.083 in Denmark to 0.675 in South Africa. Norway, Slovenia and Sweden also have comparatively 
low levels of overall inequality, while Brazil and Guatemala stand out at the upper end. Inequality of opportunity 
levels (IEOL) range from 0.003 in Norway and 0.005 in Slovenia to 0.199 in Guatemala and 0.223 in Brazil. In 
other words, the (lower-bound) level of inequality in the distribution of values of opportunity sets across types 
in Brazil is almost three times as high as the total inequality (measured by the same index) in the distribution 
of actual incomes in Denmark. One can also observe substantial differences in IEOL among countries at closer 
levels of development, and more methodologically comparable: Madagascar's level of inequality of opportunity 
is twice that of Ghana; those of the US and the UK are ten times that of Norway and almost four times higher 
than Denmark's. 
The ratio of these two inequality measures, i.e. the (lower-bound) share of the overall inequality due to 
inequality of opportunity (IEOR), also varies substantially, from 0.02 in Norway to 0.34 in Guatemala. Slovenia 
also has a low inequality of opportunity ratio, at 0.05, while Brazil closely follows Guatemala in the upper tail, 
at around 0.32. 
Brunori et al. (2013) also investigate how these IOp measures correlate with some other important variables, 
such as output per capita, overall income inequality, and measures of intergenerational mobility. They report a 
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non-linear relationship between inequality of opportunity and the level of development, measured by the 
logarithm of per capita income levels. The resulting association appears to have an inverted-U shape, much as 
the "Kuznets curve" that used to be hypothesized for the relation between income inequality and the "level of 
development". The regression of IEOR on a quadratic of log GNI per capita produces a coefficient on the linear 
term of 0.32 (p-value: 0.05), and that on the quadratic term is -0.017 (p-value: 0.05). While the poorest countries 
in the sample are all located in Africa, the middle income countries near the turning point of the inverted-U 
include a number of Latin American countries, as well as Egypt, South Africa and Turkey. The richer part of the 
sample is dominated by European countries and the United States. Although these tend to be more EOp 
egalitarian, there is still a considerable spread among them. 
Another question that naturally arises is whether there is any empirical association between inequality of 
opportunity and income inequality. Brunori et al. (2013) find a significant positive association between overall 
inequality (in economic advantage) and the share of that inequality associated with inequality of opportunity 
(IEOR). The correlation coefficient is 0.523 (p-value: 0.0004). 
Such positive correlation might be driven by a number of possible mechanisms, the most plausible amongst 
them being the fact that today's outcomes shape tomorrow's opportunities: large income gaps between today's 
parents are likely to imply bigger gaps in the quality of education, or access to labor market opportunities, 
among tomorrow's children. Obviously, if opportunity sets differ substantially among people, then individual 
outcomes are also likely to be more unequal, thus suggesting the possible existence of the reverse direction of 
causation.  
4.2 IOp in transition economies 
 
The 2016-2017 Transition Report by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development, 2016), focuses on inequality and inclusion and devotes a whole chapter 
to the theme of inequality of opportunity. This section presents the main results emerging from such chapter 
and in particular those concerning inequality of opportunity with respect to individuals’ incomes. 
The analysis is based on the last wave of the Life in Transition Survey (LiTS), which has been carried out by the 
World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) between 2015 and 2016. The 
variable used for income is the self-reported wage coming from employment over the last 12 months, while 
the measure for inequality of opportunity is based on the Gini index. 
First, the Transition Report compares inequality of opportunity (both in absolute and relative terms) between 
the EBRD region and other countries and across the EBRD region. Total inequality of opportunity in the EBRD 
region is on average higher than in Western Europe (Figure 1, left axis), but much more modest than other 
emerging economies or the US. In India inequality of opportunity for income is over three times larger than the 
average in the EBRD region. In the US, it is nearly twice as large and in Brazil it is almost ten times bigger.  
As regards total inequality of opportunity across the EBRD region, the variation is largest within south-eastern 
Europe (SEE) where Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Montenegro display some of the lowest estimates, 
comparable to that for Germany. Meanwhile inequality of opportunity in Kosovo, Romania and Bulgaria is 
estimated to be above the median for the EBRD region as a whole. Eastern Europe and the Caucasus (EEC) and 
Central Asia display more uniform regional trends with relatively high inequality of opportunity.  
Relative inequality of opportunity is notably lower in Germany than in the transition region (Figure 1, right axis), 
whereas it is substantially high in Italy and Czech Republic. 
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Figure 1. Total inequality of opportunity (left axis) and relative inequality of opportunity (right axes) for income 
acquisition 
 
Source: EBRD Transition Report 2016-17. 
Secondly, the Report highlights the relationship existing between inequality of opportunity and income inequality 
(Figure 2). Such relationship tends to be stronger for countries with higher inequality and weaker for countries 
with lower inequality. In particular, in Germany and several SEE countries the estimated inequality of opportunity 
is low with respect to the Gini measure of income inequality.  
Figure 2. Inequality of opportunity and income inequality 
 
Source: EBRD Transition Report 2016-17. 
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Finally, the Report addresses the issue concerning the contribution of different circumstances to overall 
inequality of opportunity.  Figure 3 shows the absolute inequality of opportunity on its bars, while the various 
colours correspond to the contributions of each circumstance.  Different countries display different drivers, 
however the major part of the inequality of opportunity can be traced back to parental background. This 
accounts for more than 50 per cent of overall inequality of opportunity in a third of the countries where the 
EBRD invests and is important in almost all other countries. Gender represents the second most important 
factor: it explains between one-quarter and one-half of the overall inequality of opportunity in most countries. 
Birthplace accounts for an average of 16 per cent of the inequality of opportunity and its impact is not always 
consistent. Lastly, being part of an ethnic minority on average accounts for only 7 per cent of the total inequality 
of opportunity.  
Figure 3. Parental background and gender matter most for explaining inequality of opportunity for income acquisition 
 
 
Source: EBRD Transition Report 2016-17. 
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5 Conclusions 
 
According to the EOp theory, the realization of each individual desired achievement should not be hindered by 
unequal circumstances. Policies are needed to level the playing filed. For example, a policymaker might 
compensate individuals for the effect of bad circumstances on their outcome, through the definition of specific 
forms of investment in education.  
According to the EOp theory an optimal policy should take consistently into account two goals: the minimization 
of the unfair inequality of outcome and the efficient allocation of social resources. However, translating the 
ideal of equality of opportunity into a public intervention is not a straightforward exercise. In particular, different 
policy implications emerge. Due to its simpler structure and lower information requirements, the ex-ante 
approach is probably more appealing for policy makers, and is adopted in the discussion that follows. 
Some conclusions are possible. 
The implementation of the principle of Equality of opportunity goes beyond the application of the principle of 
non-discrimination, according to which individuals with different characteristics should be treated equally 
whenever the individual attributes are irrelevant with respect the a given outcome (e.g., race and gender should 
not matter when it comes to outcomes such as access to school, health or labour markets).  In fact, levelling 
the playing field might require positive discrimination, in the sense that public policies are called to reduce as 
much as possible the gaps arising from social or inherited (including genetic) conditions that are outside 
individual's control. In the field of education this is the case, e.g., of i) policies directed at supporting access to 
education (and its completion) by students from low socio-economic or migrant background; ii) policies 
supporting the learning of students with some type of learning disability and impairment. On the other hand, 
an educational policy supporting equal spending per pupil would not be consistent with Equality of opportunity, 
exactly because it does not compensates for the existence of circumstances inhibiting access to education or 
learning. 
The value of the principle of Equality of opportunity is particularly high when we consider aspects of life where 
"personal history" matters. This is clearly the case for education and health: in both cases the current status (i.e. 
current health or current skills and labour market status) very much depends upon what has happened in the 
past. Early interventions are preferable because they permit to close the gap earlier in life, more successfully 
and with lower costs. The focus on education and health care is justified also on the ground that human capital 
is the essential factor determining labour market status, labour income, wealth and, ultimately, individual 
welfare. Examples of policies improving Equality of opportunity in the area of human capital are: child-care 
facilities available for everyone free of charge, universal and free of charge decent primary education, universal 
and free of charge access to health treatment, financial support to tertiary education attendance for students 
from low socio-economic background. In all these cases, policies are directed at breaking the linkage between 
participation/provision of services and socio-economic origin (and, more generally, circumstances).  
However, policies directed at improving Equality of opportunity do not come for free. They need to be financed, 
typically through redistributive taxation. This might give rise to a trade-off between guaranteeing EOp and 
insuring efficiency. Finding the optimal trade-off between the two is complex, and the preferred solution 
depends upon personal, political and ethical values. Left-wing governments tend to favour EOp while right-wing 
governments are more concerned with the loss of efficiency. However, the trade-off between the two principles 
might not arise: if we start from a situation in which EOp is not guaranteed and market failures exist, it is 
possible (in fact, likely) that rising EOp also improves efficiency (in spite of the negative effects of redistributive 
taxation). This is the case for public spending on education and health care (which tend to rise human capital), 
but also for active labour market policies and for efficient unemployment schemes (which improve labour 
market functioning). In fact, there is evidence that EOp and growth are positively related, and this calls for 
supporting social expenditures that have an investment character, as they ultimately improve overall 
productivity.  
The potential trade-offs between EOp and efficiency are particularly interesting in the case of education, which 
spans over a large period (potentially the entire life-cycle), it is dynamic (yesterdays' choices affect todays 
opportunities), it cannot abstract from individual preferences and abilities, and where trade-offs go beyond the 
issue of redistributive taxation. For instance, it is debated the extent to which EOp in education should promote 
quotas for access to higher education by disadvantaged groups, for instance by lowering the entry requirements 
to tertiary education for selected groups (with potential negative effects on the "quality" of graduates). 
Alternatively, it is discussed whether EOp policies supporting low-ability students in compulsory schools imply 
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a disadvantage for high ability students, who could lose motivation and ambition and who could face reduced 
available resources (if the educational budget is fixed). 
We think that it is important to distinguish between the acquisition of attributes (e.g., in primis through 
education) that are relevant in the competition for social positions and the actual competition. EOp should be 
applied to the first, so that everyone has the same chances to later compete in life. However, at the moment in 
which competition happens, EOp could be abandoned in favour of the non-discrimination (or meritocratic) 
principle. An example might clarify: when it comes to selecting medical doctors, it is important to make sure 
that everyone has the same chances to attend and complete medical school, irrespective of their background; 
however, it would be unwise to lower professional requirement to promote graduates from a disadvantaged 
background at the moment of choosing who is going to perform surgery.  Hence, distinguishing between 
compulsory and non-compulsory education is important. In the former (and especially up to primary education), 
preferences matter less, programs are quite homogeneous and pupils have limited options to choose from, 
while abilities play an important role in determining student's' success. Since in most countries compulsory 
education is provided for free by the State, in this phase of life EOp policies should focus on guaranteeing to 
everyone proper instructional resources and on overcoming difficulties and learning gaps of disadvantaged 
students, limiting the negative effects on high performing students. The focus here is on insuring that everyone 
has access to decent education, irrespective of the socio-economic and geographical background, and this 
implies that in-kind policies (such as support to low ability students, additional hours of math or foreign 
language etc.) are more effective than cash transfers. However, as they grow, students develop abilities, skills 
and preferences and education policies should be able to guarantee that everyone, irrespective of the socio-
economic background of origin, can access and complete upper secondary or tertiary education, in the field that 
closely resembles his or her preferences. In this case, cash transfers are very useful as they reduce the extent 
to which limited economic resources impact on students' participation to higher education. Information policies 
on the benefits and costs of tertiary education are important as well, as they affect students' aspirations and 
expectations.  
Does EOp imply that there is no space for ex-post distributive policies? We think that the appropriate answer is 
no. While the public sector can do a lot to try to make access to education and health independent from income 
and wealth conditions, it is unlikely that complete equalization of opportunities is realized. Which means that 
an “unfair” portion of inequality resists even when a distributionally-sensitive policy maker tries to equalize 
opportunities. In fact, scholars argue that simply creating a levelled playing field would not be sufficient for (a) 
if outcomes cause hardship they cannot be ignored if we want to ensure dignity to all citizens30, and (b) 
inequality of outcomes directly affects equality of opportunity for the next generation, since today’s ex-post 
outcomes shape tomorrow’s ex-ante playing field. We can then conclude that the equality of opportunity 
approach is consistent with public intervention directed both at eliminating sources of ex-ante inequality 
affecting future and current opportunities and at correcting, ex-post, for the unfairness in the redistribution of 
actual opportunities, for the current and future generations. 
 
 
                                           
30  Dignity is the first of the six value pillars enshrined in the European Union Charter of rights, the other being equality, freedom, 
solidarity, citizenship, and justice. 
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